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I. INTRODUCTION
June 12, 2014, was an important day for the future of battery-powered
automobiles. On that day Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla Motors, surprised the
world with a blog post announcing that all of his company’s patents were open
for anyone to use.1 Musk stated that Tesla would not “initiate patent lawsuits
against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use [their] technology.”2 On its
face this seems like a bizarre decision. Tesla is known for being at the forefront
of the electric automobile market by manufacturing electric cars that travel
significantly farther on a single charge than any other electric car on the
market.3 For a company that’s unique and profitable patents were the main
differentiator in the automotive market to simply pledge those protections away
was a move that came as a shocking surprise to many.
One of the main reasons patents exist is because of the property right
protections provided by the federal government to “exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.”4 Patents historically
have been the foundation for innovation and protecting one’s inventions in
order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”5 If someone
comes up with a novel idea and is granted a patent for that idea by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, then that person may sue, in the
appropriate federal court, anyone who infringes on that patent in the U.S. for an
injunction or monetary damages.6
However, Elon Musk is no entrepreneurial amateur,7 and Tesla is not a small
company with a limited number of worthless patents.8 According to Musk,
1 See Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA MOTORS (June 12, 2014), http://
www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
2 Id.
3 See Alex Davies & Mike Nudelman, Here’s How Tesla’s Model S Compares to Other Top Electric
Cars, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 16, 2013, 11:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/electric-car-com
parison-chart-2013-8.
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); see also United States Patent and Trademark Office, General
Information Concerning Patents (Oct. 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/generalinformation-concerning-patents.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents,
INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS (Oct. 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/generalinformation-concerning-patents#heading-28.
7 See Ashlee Vance, Elon Musk, the 21st Century Industrialist, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 14, 2012,
6:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-09-13/elon-musk-the-21st-century-ind
ustrialist; see also Erik Gregersen, Elon Musk: American Entrepreneur, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Elon-Musk (Musk co-founded Zip2 which was
eventually acquired by Compaq for more than $300 million. He then co-founded X.com which
would eventually become PayPal and be acquired by Ebay for $1.5 billion. Musk then went on to
help found SolarCity and SpaceX. SpaceX is currently the most well-known private space
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opening Tesla’s patents was for the “advancement of electric vehicle
technology.”9 Holding onto their patents is akin to “lay[ing] intellectual
property landmines behind [them] to inhibit others” and would be acting
adversely to their goal of “accelerat[ing] the advent of sustainable transport.”10
Instead of helping encourage innovation and progress, Musk reasoned that
patents often “serve merely to stifle progress, entrench the positions of giant
corporations and enrich those in the legal profession, rather than the actual
inventors.”11 Tesla had patented so much of its technology out of a fear that
larger auto companies would take advantage of Tesla’s advancements and
“overwhelm” Tesla with their substantially significant resources.12 Instead, the
large companies average less than 1% of their total vehicle sales in electric and
have mostly ignored Tesla’s growing impact.13 Instead of the traditional “us
versus them” model of competition, Musk reasoned that it was instead a battle
of everyone against the carbon crisis.14 According to Musk, Tesla simply
cannot produce electric cars fast enough, and so they are hoping that opening
their patents will encourage other companies to cut back on their gas engines
and instead produce more battery powered vehicles.15
As recently as 2013, Tesla was a staunch believer in the need for patents to
protect its inventions and place in the market.16 Tesla even filed suits in the past
to protect its intellectual property.17 Given this history and the potential lack of a
binding effect Musk’s patent pledge holds, many attorneys in the field have been
reluctant to advise their clients to proceed with using the patents until a more
exploration company. While Musk did not found Tesla, he has been instrumental in its growth as
the CEO. He is currently the largest shareholder in SolarCity, SpaceX, and Tesla.).
8 See Tesla Motors, Annual Report for the Fiscal Period ended December 31, 2013, Form 10-K at 5,
http://ir.teslamotors.com/secfiling.cfm?filingid=1193125-14-69681&cik= (last visited Sept. 19,
2016) (indicating 203 issued patents and more than 280 pending patent applications). Tesla did
not indicate how many patents they hold or have filed for in their 2014 Annual 10-K Report.
9 Musk, supra note 1.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Tesla Motors, supra note 8, at 22 (“Our success depends, at least in part, on our ability to
protect our core technology and intellectual property. To accomplish this, we rely on a
combination of patents, patent applications, trade secrets, including know-how, employee and
third party nondisclosure agreements, copyright laws, trademarks, intellectual property licenses
and other contractual rights to establish and protect our proprietary rights in our technology.”).
17 See Complaint at 2, Tesla Motors, Inc. v. Fisker Coachbuild, LLC, No. CIV472032 (Cali.
Super. Ct. San Mateo Cnty. Apr. 14, 2008); see also John Markoff, Tesla Motors Files Suit Against
Competitor Over Design Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/
technology/15tesla.html?_r=0.
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definite defense is in place.18 If all the goals and dreams of Tesla and other open
patents are to be realized, there must be a certain degree of reliability.19 The
inability of innovators to rely on the unofficial promise prevents the field from
being able to capitalize on open patents to their full potential. Current patent law
does not offer the necessary protections, and as such, a tool from another field
should be modified and made available for patents.
Part II of this Note examines the background of Tesla’s decision and why
that decision is not as effective as Musk believes. Part III discusses some of the
more prominent trust institutions currently in place in patent law that may be
helpful to Tesla. Part IV will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each
option and ultimately argue that adopting a Creative Commons License for
patents will serve as the best trust institution to encourage adoption of Tesla
patents to accomplish Musk’s goals of a wider market adoption of electric
vehicle technology. A brief conclusion follows.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. TESLA’S MOTIVATIONS

Elon Musk disclosed several noble reasons for opening up Tesla’s patents, but
several commentators have identified alternative reasons that may be more likely.
The first and most obvious reason is the chance for market growth for Tesla.21
18 See Ryan Davis, Devil’s In The Details Of Tesla’s Open Patent Pledge, LAW 360 (June 13, 2014, 8:21
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/547910/devil-s-in-the-details-of-tesla-s-open-patent-pledge.
19 Currently it is unclear whether anyone has utilized any of Tesla’s patents. However, it
appears that at this point the largest manufacturers have not. See Nikki Gordon-Bloomfield,
Honda, GM, Dismiss Tesla Electric Car Patent Giveaway. Are Others Following Suit?, TRANSPORT
EVOLVED (June 30, 2014), https://transportevolved.com/2014/06/30/honda-gm-dismiss-teslaelectric-car-patent-giveaway-others-following-suit/. Additionally, BMW and Volkswagen have
announced plans to build a charging network that is incompatible with Tesla’s vehicles. See
Aaron Tilley, Striking Back Against Tesla, BMW And Volkswagen Team Up To Build 100 Fast Charging
EV Stations, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/
01/22/bmw-volkswagen-100-fast-charging-stations/.
20 Shortly after this Note was submitted for publication, the Colorado Technology Law Journal
published Stephanie Vu’s note, Pledging Patents Effectively: Copyright and Open Source as a Framework for
Patent Pledges, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 437 (2016). That note covers many of the same issues with
Tesla’s patent pledge and examines similar possible solutions, but this Note dedicates a
substantial amount of focus to examining trust institutions and their possible role in solving
coordination problems Musk seeks to avoid. This Note also deals with patent pools and standard
setting with RAND policies as possible solutions to the uncertainty created by Tesla’s patent
pledge which the Vu note does not cover.
21 See Jeff Roberts, What Elon Musk did — and did not — do when he “opened” Tesla’s patents,
GIGAOM RESEARCH (June 14, 2014, 5:18 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/06/14/what-elon-mus
k-did-and-did-not-do-when-he-opened-teslas-patents/.
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Currently, the market for pure electric vehicles is extremely small. Electric vehicle
sales have tripled since 2013, but they are still less than a third of a percent of the
annual U.S. production.22 However genuine Musk’s claims are about fighting the
carbon crisis through expansion of the electric market, a likely reason is the
expansion of the charging station network. Tesla’s cars are pure electric cars and
not hybrids, and they must use charging stations instead of gas stations. While it
is Tesla’s goal to put a supercharger charging station within range of 98% of all
American drivers by the end of 2015, it is not always so convenient to find Tesla’s
charging type nearby on the road.23 As of the writing of this Note, there are 521
Tesla “supercharger” stations with 2,941 “superchargers” in the United States.24
When compared to the nearly 121,446 gas stations in the United States,25 it is easy
to see how much more convenient it is to refuel a gas engine. Advancing growth
of electric vehicles that utilize the same charging technology from Tesla’s patents
could make it possible to essentially recruit other manufacturers from across the
industry to participate in creating compatible charging stations.26 By encouraging
their competitors to develop electric vehicles designed to plug into their electric
station network instead of a different charging type, Tesla stands to capitalize on a
potential fortune.27
Secondly, Tesla has the opportunity to sell the batteries they manufacture to
the potential companies that produce electric cars based on Tesla’s patents.
Towards the end of 2014, Musk announced the location of Tesla’s new
“Gigafactory” in Nevada.28 The battery production facility promises to double
the global capacity of lithium-ion batteries, and when completed, will be twenty
times larger than the largest battery factory currently in production.29 The
ability to produce so many of their unique batteries on such a large scale would
make Tesla the easy supplier choice for other manufacturers looking to get into
22 See Wharton Sch. of the Univ. of Pa., What’s Driving Tesla’s Open Source Gambit? (June 25,
2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whats-driving-teslas-open-source-gambit/.
23 See Adam Lesser, Tesla fast charging and why it’s getting inconvenient for future EV drivers, GIGAOM
(Aug. 8, 2013, 2:15 AM), https://gagaom.com/2013/08/08/tesla-fast-charging-and-why-its-getti
ng-inconvenient-for-future-ev-drivers/.
24 See TESLA SUPERCHARGER, http://www.teslamotors.com/supercharger (last visited Sept. 13,
2016).
25 See Gas Station Indus. Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN RESEARCH INST., http://www.statisticbrain.
com/gas-station-statistics/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
26 See William J. Watkins, Jr., Rethinking Patent Enforcement: Tesla Did What?, FORBES (July 17,
2014, 1:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/07/17/rethinking-patent-enforce
ment-tesla-did-what/.
27 Id.
28 See Matthew L. Wald, Nevada a Winner in Tesla’s Battery Contest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/business/energy-environment/nevada-a-winner-in-teslas
-battery-contest.html.
29 Id.
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the electric car market. If other car producers adopt Tesla’s battery design in
creating new electric vehicles, then it is reasonable that they would be potential
customers to buy the batteries straight from Tesla instead of trying to produce
the batteries themselves in large quantities. This would result in a sizeable
source of income directly related to allowing others to copy their technology.30
B. OTHER BENEFITS OF OPENING UP PATENTS

The impact and benefits of Tesla’s patent pledge can extend far beyond the
obvious immediate benefits to that single company to meeting many of the
needs not addressed by the current patent system.31 The historical justification
for patents was the overall betterment of society by “encouraging inventors to
share their innovations with others.”32 This involved a tradeoff between the
inventors and society.33 The inventors received an exclusive monopoly over
their idea for a period of time, and society received a new and useful
invention.34 Over time, the types of patents granted have changed drastically.
Early patents often described complete products,35 and inventions like the
historical steam engine typically involved licensing only one or two patents.36
Many of today’s technologies are infinitely more complex. As such, the finished
products we buy can involve hundreds of patents owned by a multitude of
individuals and organizations.37
In many high tech industries, a key component of successful Research and
Development is the potential for cumulative innovation.38 Cumulative
innovation is where a new invention has to rely on preexisting ones instead of
30 See Jerry Hirsch & Tiffany Hsu, Elon Musk opens up Tesla patents to everyone, L.A. TIMES (June
12, 2014, 6:28 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-tesla-open-source-20140613story.html; see also Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Tesla on Patents: Open Source Altruism or Shrewd
Business?, IPWATCHDOG (July 8, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/08/tesla-on-pate
nts-open-source-altruism-or-shrewd-business/id=50331/.
31 While this Note is not set out to argue against patents as a whole, it would be remiss not to
discuss some of the theorized benefits of foregoing patent protection.
32 See Janelle A. Bailey, AIA: The Building Block of Communal Innovation, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
325, 348 (2014) (quoting Aimee Boss, The Twenty-First Century Patent System Improvement Act: Is It
Really an Improvement?, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 725, 726 (1999)).
33 See Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent Pools, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 426
(2014); Grant C. Yang, The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source Movement, 13
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 194 (2005).
34 Mattioli, supra note 33; Yang, supra note 33.
35 Mattioli, supra note 33, at 427.
36 See Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 112 (2012).
37 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV.
1857, 1868 (2003) (“Cumulative innovation is the hallmark of high-tech industries such as
computer software, semiconductors, molecular biology, and pharmacology.” (footnotes omitted)).
38 Id. at 1867.
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being independent of previous innovation.39 Given that high tech electric
vehicles are still in their infancy compared to traditional gas engines, it is almost
a necessity that others have the opportunity to cumulatively innovate Tesla’s
existing technology. Since Tesla’s battery powered vehicles are superior in range
to all the present competition,40 it would be incredibly difficult for someone else
to innovate in that high tech sector independent of previous innovation.41 No
one else has developed a battery as good as Tesla’s, and it seems unlikely that
anyone will make something better without basing it in part on Tesla’s patented
technology.
Heller and Eisenberg theorized that such an interweaving of patent coverage
may result in a “tragedy of the anticommons” where “multiple owners each
have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an
effective privilege of use.”42 The transaction costs involved in negotiating the
licensing fees with multiple patent owners could very well prevent innovators
from pursuing their research and development plans altogether and seriously
threaten long-term innovation.43 The growth of the free software movement
has shown that reducing those access costs for follow-on innovators has the
potential to increase the chances of improvements and broad market
adoption.44 This is exactly what Tesla wants and needs.
The current “tragedy of the anticommons” for the auto industry is the
market for suitable electric vehicles. There are only a handful of major players,
and those players control the lion’s share of the most successful patents.45 By
pledging the patents for the most successful batteries and charging stations to
date, Tesla is fighting against a “tragedy of the anticommons.”
Tesla opening up their patents is good for both the company and the public
by allowing others to use and transform the technology,46 and recognizing the
Id.
Davies & Nudelman, supra note 3.
41 Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 37.
42 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–700 (1998).
43 Mattioli, supra note 33, at 427.
44 Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 37, at 1870–71.
45 See Steve Brachmann, In the global race for Electric Vehicle innovation, America tops Japan for first
place, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/02/electric-vehicleinnovation-america-tops-japan/id=61178/ (noting that together Ford and GM own almost onethird of the electric vehicle patents in the U.S.); see also Maulin Shah, Auto Industry May Ignore Tesla
Patents, PATENTVUE (June 26, 2014, 11:58 AM), http://patentvue.com/2014/06/26/auto-indust
ry-may-ignore-tesla-patents/ (“[W]hile Tesla may not have much competition in the commercial
marketplace for purely electric vehicles, automotive giants such as General Motors, Toyota,
Honda, Ford, Nissan, and Daimler have all amassed significant patent portfolios related to
electric vehicle technology.”).
46 Bailey, supra note 32, at 348.
39
40
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need for communal innovation allows for a better realization of the future value
when dealing with a high tech sector of a traditional good.47 In such a situation,
disclosing one’s patents benefits both the original inventor and society,48 but
maintaining strict control over those patents will serve as a hindrance to such
goals. Follow-up innovators are given the chance to transform the product into
something that fulfills the growing need of society.49
C. ISSUES WITH TESLA’S PLEDGE

As beneficial as the open patents are to Tesla, the electric car market, and
possibly even the world, there are still issues for a company who wishes to use
Tesla’s patents. Currently there are scant legal protections for other
manufacturers who may wish to take Musk up on his offer.50 There is a
potential fear that Tesla could take advantage of the expanded market for
batteries and charging stations before reneging on their promise of nonlitigation and suing the competitors for large settlements.51 If companies create
new products based on Tesla’s technology, there is a substantial chance that
they could still be sued.52 Tesla has not shied away from using its legal
protections to protect its intellectual property. As recently as 2008 Tesla sued a
manufacturer over its use of trade secrets and confidential information.53
Because of this risk, a company must have a great deal of trust in Elon Musk’s
promise before making the decision to invest costly and valuable research and
development funds in such a venture.
Some critics have been quick to point out that saying Tesla “opened” their
patents is quite simply a misnomer.54 When the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office grants a patent, that very patent is published for the entire world to see.55

Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 37, at 1868.
Id. at 1876.
49 Musk, supra note 1. In this case Elon Musk has identified electric non-carbon emitting
vehicles as the growing need for society.
50 Id.
51 Quinn & Brachmann, supra note 30.
52 Roberts, supra note 21.
53 See Complaint, supra note 17 (Tesla sued Fisker Coachbuild, a formerly retained automobile
manufacturer, for allegedly using Tesla’s trade secrets and confidential information in designing
their own electric vehicle); see also John O’Dell, Tesla Ordered To Pay Fisker $1.14 Million After Losing
Trade Secrets Case, EDMUNDS (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.edmunds.com/autoobserver-archive/20
08/12/tesla-ordered-to-pay-fisker-114-million-after-losing-trade-secrets-case.html (noting that
eventually an arbitrator ruled in favor of Fisker Coachbuild and awarded them $1.14 million in
legal fees).
54 Roberts, supra note 21.
55 Id.
47
48
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In exchange for publishing their intellectual secret, the Patent Office grants a
narrow monopoly to the inventor of that item.56
This monopoly is not exactly something that Tesla “gave away” either.
Without entering into a contractual licensing agreement or other formal
assignment with the specific user of Tesla’s patents, it still retain, all of its rights
and enforcement opportunities.57 Since Tesla has not fully ceded its ownership
rights to the public domain, it occupies a middle ground between giving them
away and retaining full rights.58
Musk’s blog post on the company website lacks all the formalities of a
contractual agreement. While Google has a similar, yet untested, open patent
pledge for cloud-related patents, it appears to be much more formal and was
most likely drafted by an attorney instead of the CEO.59 Such formality and
boilerplate language makes it more likely to be upheld by a court as a valid
contract. Unlike the pledges of other large companies, Musk’s statements lack
an intention for his representations to be held as legally binding or irrevocable.60
This means that Tesla may be able to withdraw or change its “open source”
patent policy at any time.61
Furthermore, Musk stipulated in his blog post that Tesla would not seek
patent infringement litigation against those who used the patents “in good
faith.”62 While this seems to give Tesla a little more flexibility63 in preventing
patent abuse, it also must cause the potential user to pause. What constitutes
“good faith” to Elon Musk? Keep in mind that without some protective
instrument or license in place, Tesla could very well sue even if the user had the
best of faith in using the patent. So far Musk’s clarifications of “good faith”
have not been overly exhaustive or helpful. He was quoted as saying, “[w]e
would not want someone to mimic our car in such a way to deceive customers
into whether it is a Tesla,” and that he is “looking for common sense and
fairness.”64 While not allowing companies to pass themselves off as Tesla was

56 See Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing and the Emergence of A New Patent Market, 9 HOUS. BUS. &
TAX L.J. 445, 463 (2009).
57 Id. at 463–64.
58 See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 545 (2015).
59 See Google, Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge, http://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/pl
edge/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
60 See Richard Johnson & Michael Damiani, Tesla’s patent pledge: is it enough?, LEXOLOGY (July 23,
2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bb00cbc5-dd08-415e-9d9a-c9020e1943b1.
61 See id.
62 Musk, supra note 1.
63 See Kirsten Korosec, The one asterisk on Tesla’s patent giveaway, FORTUNE (June 13, 2014, 4:37
PM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/13/the-one-asterisk-on-teslas-patent-giveaway/.
64 See Jerry Hirsch, Musk opens up Tesla car’s patents to others, SEATTLE TIMES (June 12, 2014, 6:32
PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/musk-opens-up-tesla-carrsquos-patents-to-others/.
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obvious and not much of a legitimate concern to potential battery innovators
given all the retained trademark protections, the “common sense and fairness”
is still a bit of a mystery. In another attempt to placate the possible concerns
over the “good faith” language, Musk indicated that Tesla would be willing to
enter into simple agreements with companies that are worried about
unintentionally breaching that clause.65
Another aspect of Musk’s “good faith” involves how the companies interact
when using one another’s patents. In a conference call, he made it clear that
just because Tesla was making its technology freely available, it did not expect
other manufactures to follow suit if Tesla wanted to use their patented
technology.66 That being said, if another company and Tesla are using each
other’s similarly valued technology, he would not expect the other to sue or
collect licensing fees.67
If Tesla does eventually decide to sue someone, how might the court rule?
At this point no one is exactly sure. Nathaniel W. Lucek, an attorney
specializing in patent law,68 has briefly written on two possible ways a company
could successfully defend against an infringement suit by Tesla.69 If a company
was able to create technological improvements based on Tesla’s patents, they
could very well obtain patents for themselves. Musk has already indicated that
he would expect the company to license the improvements back to Tesla on
“good faith grounds,”70 but there is no guarantee that this would happen.
Lucek also identified a laches defense as a possibility.71 Essentially the
infringer would have to argue that based on the amount of time Tesla takes to
file the suit after learning of the infringement that they “unreasonably and
inexcusably delayed filing suit and that the delay resulted in material prejudice to
the defendant.”72 If it took Tesla six years to bring the suit after actual or
constructive knowledge of the infringement, laches would be presumed by the
65 See Klint Finley, With Patent Giveaway, Tesla Shows Silicon Valley What Ingenuity Means, WIRED
(June 13, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/tesla-patents/.
66 See Mark Rogowsky, Patent Medicine: Tesla Makes Its Technology Available To Everyone, For Free, In
Bold Move For The Planet, FORBES (June 12, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markro
gowsky/2014/06/12/patent-medicine-tesla-makes-its-technology-available-to-everyone-for-freein-bold-move-for-the-planet/#6aa78f131B0f.
67 See id.
68 See Nathaniel W. Lucek, HODGSON RUSS LLP, http://www.hodgsonruss.com/professionalsNathaniel-Lucek.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
69 See Nathaniel W. Lucek, Take Off Every Zig: The Risk in Tesla’s “All Our Patent Are Belong to
You” Message, CLEAN AND GREEN LAW (July 11, 2014), http://www.cleanandgreenlaw.com/201
4/07/11/tesla-patents/.
70 Rogowsky, supra note 66.
71 Lucek, supra note 69.
72 Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Wanlass v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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court.73 Such a length of time would not be impossible.74 Tesla could be
precluded from recovering damages for infringement prior to the lawsuit or
from obtaining an injunction on products sold prior to the lawsuit if the laches
defense is successful.75
The doctrine of equitable estoppel could also serve as a complete bar to a
potential claim by Tesla.76 In a three part test the defendant must prove that
1) the patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged
infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to
enforce its patent against the alleged infringer, 2) the alleged
infringer relies on that conduct, and 3) due to its reliance, the
alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the patentee is
allowed to proceed with its claim.77
Musk’s blog post could be viewed as misleading to the infringer, and the
commencement of research and development would satisfy the reliance
requirement.78
Ultimately, there is no clear cut answer to what Tesla might do in the future,
or how the court would handle the situation if they did choose to litigate. How
such informal patent pledges will play out in the courts is uncertain, and
attempts at patent reform have been stymied.79 Without further steps Musk’s
patent pledge is likely to be viewed as insufficient motivation to take the risk of
willful patent infringement.
III. TESLA’S OPTIONS
Having established that Tesla’s voluntary pledge not to assert their patent
rights against good faith users is insufficient to encourage most individuals or
companies to actually take that risk and use them, we must now examine what
options Tesla has now to concretely assure other manufactures of their
nonlitigious intentions. Despite calls for patent reform, currently there is no

Id.
Lucek, supra note 69.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See Ecolab, Inc., 264 F.3d at 1371 (citing Scholle Corp. v. Blackhawk Molding Co., 133 F.3d
1469, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
78 Lucek, supra note 69.
79 Finley, supra note 65.
73
74
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official patent where one can selectively file for certain protections that would
meet the desires of Elon Musk and Tesla.80
To fill this void the private market has utilized a myriad of different tools to
allow for the open sharing of protected information.81 This Note will by no
means attempt an exhaustive review of all the different possibilities. Instead it
will examine a few of the major tools of particular use to Tesla and its goals.
Each tool will be discussed in broad generalizations that obviously may not be
applicable in every circumstance.
A. OPEN SOURCE

Although still a recent development in the grand scheme of intellectual
property law, the Open Source movement has developed into a useful tool in
copyright.82 Over the last thirty years there have been multiple different
approaches to Open Source licensing that all have their unique characteristics.83
Much like Musk’s views on Tesla’s car batteries, the Open Source movement
desires to “foster the reuse of available resources instead of forcing different
developers to ‘reinvent the wheel.’ ”84
Open Source originated in the copyright context of developing software.85
Because software is written by humans but carried out by computers, software
involves two sets of languages or “codes.”86 The form most often distributed is

80 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattiol, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 208
(2011) (suggesting patent reform by adding two new types of patents to “spur innovation through
information sharing.” First is a “quasi-patent” where the patent holder could only assert their
rights against direct competitors. Second is a “semi-patent” whose grant would be conditioned
on the applicant agreeing to publish all relevant research and information.).
81 See Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431, 442 (2015).
82 Id. at 442.
83 See Licenses by Name, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/licenses/alphabetical
(last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (listing over seventy different approved Open Source Licenses for
individuals and companies to use).
84 See Robert Feldman & Kris Nelson, Open Source, Open Access, and Open Transfer: Market
Approaches to Research Bottlenecks, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 14, 23 (2008).
85 See Graham Lawton, The Great Open Source Giveaway, ALTERNET (June 30, 2002), http://
www.alternet.org/story/13494/the_great_open_source_giveaway (“The open source movement
originated in 1984 when computer scientist Richard Stallman quit his job at MIT and set up the
Free Software Foundation. His aim was to create high-quality software that was freely available
to everybody. Stallman’s beef was with commercial companies that smother their software with
patents and copyrights . . . . Stallman’s move resonated round the computer science community
and now there are thousands of similar projects.”).
86 Joseph Scott Miller, Allchin’s Folly: Exploding Some Myths About Open Source Software, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 494 (2002).
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the “object code” written in a series of ones and zeros.87 The object code is the
language that can be read by computer, but which is practically unintelligible to
humans.88 If human programmers wanted to modify the software in any way,
they would need the “source code” from the original developer.89 The original
author of the software owns the copyright on both the source code and object
code,90 and they could choose to release only the object code while withholding
the source code. Many software developers do this on a regular basis, or in the
alternative, they will license out their source code.91 However, similar to Elon
Musk’s views on patents, software developers identified that there is a certain
advantage to allowing others to modify one’s work.92
Developers who wish to allow others to utilize their copyrighted code would
be ill-advised to simply renounce their copyrights and release the code into the
public domain. While others would now be free to copy and improve the
software without any permission, they would now be able to claim to have
created a derivative work.93 This means that the modifier would now have an
independent copyright and could very well choose to exercise that copyright
and prevent others from modifying.94 Software that was originally intended to
be shared with everyone could quickly be closed off, and the Open Source
Project would promptly become a failure.95
To prevent this from happening, Open Source Licenses were created.96 The
Open Source License is a modification of the traditional copyright. The
copyright owners retain a certain degree of control instead of just disclosing the
information to the public domain.97 The license allows the author to open their
creation to the public while still exercising certain control rights to ensure it
stays open for everyone.98 The way this is accomplished is by requiring the
second comer to leave their modifications and improvements as open as the
original work.99 This requirement only applies to the derivative portions that

87 See Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 117, 131 (2004).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Miller, supra note 86.
91 Feldman & Nelson, supra note 84, at 22–23.
92 Feldman, supra note 87 (such as a much faster pace to “fix bugs, provide upgrades, and
modify the program for individual requirements”).
93 Id. at 132.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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are distributed, not the entire work that may incorporate the Open Source
License or anything used internally.100
Although the Open Source movement originated in copyright law, it has
migrated over to patent law, most notably in the area of biotechnology.101 Even
though patent law and copyright law have their differences, an Open Source
Patent License can accomplish many of the same functions as its copyright
counterpart.102 The Open Source Patent License would simply be “a contract
that obligates the licensee (or user) of patented material to share that material
and improvements in a certain way, and in some instances, obligates any further
innovations or sublicensing to be conducted in the same manner.”103 To reach
Tesla’s goals all they would have to do at this point would be to license their
patents on certain traditional Open Source Terms: non-exclusivity and royaltyfree.104 That license would obligate any licensees to share their improvements
and modifications of the battery technology while still being royalty free.
B. PATENT POOLS AND STANDARD SETTING

A second potential option to encourage the adoption of Tesla’s battery
technology would be the creation of a patent pool. Patent pools have been
around since 1856 and have even been utilized in the automobile industry since
1900.105 Patent pools usually involve a well-defined field106 or complementary
technology.107 In these instances, competitors could potentially exercise their
patent rights to block competing innovation.108 Simply put, multiple owners of
intellectual property make an agreement to dump an aggregation of their
patents into a “pool.”109 This “pool” is a central entity that handles the
Miller, supra note 86, at 500.
Feldman, supra note 87, at 117–18.
102 Id. at 135 n.95.
103 See Rebecca Goulding, Emily Marden, Rachael Manion & Ed Levy, Alternative Intellectual
Property for Genomics and the Activity of Technology Transfer Offices: Emerging Directions in Research, 16 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 194, 206 (2010).
104 Id. at 207.
105 Daniel S. Sternberg, A Brief History of RAND, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 211, 217–19 (2014)
(however the Association of License Automobile Manufacturers was quickly dissolved after losing
a patent infringement suit against Henry Ford when Ford was allowed to continue manufacturing
without membership and access to the pool’s patent).
106 See Antony Taubman, Sharing Technology to Meet a Common Challenge: Navigating Proposals for
Patent Pools, Patent Commons and Open Innovation, WIPO MAGAZINE 4 (Apr. 2009), http://webcitati
on.org/5u1TOWHBI.
107 See Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions to the Anticommons Threat, 12 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 487, 501 (2012).
108 Id.
109 See CYNTHIA CANNADY, TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS §§ 18, 8.1 (ed. 2015).
100
101

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss1/10

14

Hill: Powering Intellectual Property Sharing: How to Make Tesla’s Paten

2016]

POWERING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHARING

205

licensing of the contributed patents.110 Once in the pool, the related patents
lose certain individual property characteristics and instead take on a collective
character.111 The pool members share the patents in the pool, and allow
outsiders to use the pool on certain licensing terms.112 By joining together, they
can all benefit by “integrating complementary technologies, reducing
transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly litigation.”113
The accessibility of the pool to non-members depends on whether the pool
is “open” or “closed.”114 In a “closed” pool, only the members are able to
utilize each other’s patents in the pool.115 This allows the members to maintain
the exclusive nature of their patent rights and benefits with regards to everyone
not in the pool.116 Limiting the patent sharing to a “closed” pool is often
preferred because the members have more control and they have already
consented to the other members use.117 In the alternative, an “open” pool is
one in which any interested party has access to the technologies covered by the
pool.118 While this access still is not as inclusive as membership to the pool, the
non-members are often granted a non-exclusive license with a pre-determined
fee and royalty percentage.119
Though it does not appear Tesla would be interested in a licensing fee or
royalty percentage,120 it seems fairly clear that they would prefer the open pool
for the simple reason that open pools reach a larger audience of innovators
because of the less restricted access to technology.121 However, this may prove
110 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1340 (1996).
111 CANNADY, supra note 109, § 8.1 (comparing patent pools to water in a pool to complete the
metaphor).
112 Id.
113 Marshall, supra note 107 (quoting Robert S. Chaloupka, CORP. COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO INTELL.
PROP. § 15:22 (2011–2012 update)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 Id. at 509–10.
115 Id.
116 Id. However this could lead to anticompetitive accusations. See Feldman, supra note 87, at
166 (discussing collusion in patent pools to restrain price or divide markets or coordinate to
exclude competition as concerns for anticompetitive and potentially illegal behavior).
117 Marshall, supra note 107, at 509.
118 Taubman, supra note 106.
119 Marshall, supra note 107, at 510.
120 See Elaine Sullivan, Elon Musk Speech on why Hydrogen fuel cell is dumb (Jan. 22, 2017), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ruYW1gii5U&feature=youtu.be, at 3:20 (Press Video, Elon Musk
on why Hydrogen fuel cell is dumb (Jan. 14, 2015, 3:20), http://hdwon.com/video/Elon-Musk-onwhy-Hydrogen-fuel-cell-is-dumb-1312015/7ALLwLd K-5U (displaying press conference where
Musk said that not having a licensing process was “better because then we don’t need to get into
any kind of discussions”).
121 Marshall, supra note 107, at 510. That being said, the licensing and royalties are not so
simply cut between open and closed pools. There are simple and sophisticated pools that range
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to be a point of contention with other potential members who do not fully buy
into Musk’s views on patents.
One particular feature of patent pools is the ability to come together to set
standards in certain areas of technology. Such standard-setting organizations
have been at the heart of many technologies the average consumer uses on a daily
basis.122 While it is completely possible to have a patent pool without standardsetting,123 the very nature of pooling patents together tends to involve the strategy
of adopting one standard technology for everyone in the pool to adopt without
infringing on one another’s patents.124 Setting a standard allows an industry to
develop a platform of interoperable and related yet competitive technologies.125
Once the different organizations come together and set the standard for a
future area of technology while disclosing their relevant intellectual property,
they usually request that their members agree to license their patents on RAND
(reasonable and non-discriminatory) terms.126 These RAND commitments are
often thought of as a way to prevent market abuse.127 When one company’s
patented technology is chosen for the standard, their patents become essential
since their use is required to meet the standard.128 The RAND licensing terms
are meant to prevent that company from taking advantage of their new market
power by refusing to license or charging excessively high rates.129 Similar to
how membership in a patent pool allowed the members to utilize the patents
without fear of litigation, the RAND promise assures standard adopters the
right to use the patented technology without fear of the patent holder’s
revocation.130 While there are arguments that the lack of objective definitions

from no royalties to royalties based on relative value of used intellectual property or royalties
from third parties. See Feldman, supra note 87, at 166.
122 CANNADY, supra note 109 (discussing how standard-setting organizations have helped
produce USB, MPEG, and mobile networks for cellphones); see also Sternberg, supra note 105, at
213 (“[A]lmost every electronic device on the market implements at least one industry
standard.”).
123 Many authors treat Standard Setting Organizations as completely separate entities from
Patent Pools. See Sternberg, supra note 105, at 223.
124 CANNADY, supra note 109.
125 Id.
126 See Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for Licensing in
Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672
(2007) (explaining that there is no universally agreed upon operational definition of the
commitment). Europe employs FRAND commitments with the “F” standing for “fair,” but
there is no substantial difference between the two.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the
Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 389 (2007).
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concerning RAND is a stumbling block, it still functionally guarantees the
adopters access to the standard.131
C. CREATIVE COMMONS

Founded in 2001, Creative Commons is a non-profit organization that has
created several different licenses of which copyright users can take advantage.132
The Creative Commons license was modeled after the Open Source License,
but was intended for all the different copyrighted materials not related to the
software field including music, film, texts, images, and many other creative
works.133 Given the technical requirements and unique nature of software, the
open source license was not so easily applicable to the other types of
copyrighted materials, and Creative Commons Licenses are likewise not
designated for software use.134
When the founders of Creative Commons came together, they identified a
need to develop a fine-tuned workable model by which authors could choose
how to share their works in a still somewhat limited manner without fully giving
their work over to the public domain.135 The goal was to still rely on the
protections granted by copyright law while replacing “all rights reserved” (the
traditional formal language of copyright notice)136 with “some rights
reserved.”137 Hopefully this would reduce the transaction costs inherent to
licensing out one’s works on an individual basis. Instead of requiring desired
users to contact every author individually to set up a licensing agreement
involving royalties, terms of use, and lawyers, the author could instead
announce to the entire world that anyone could use their works royalty-free,
provided the users did not violate the terms of the license.138
Id. at 358.
See History, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited
Sept. 14, 2016).
133 See TILL KREUTZER, OPEN CONTENT – A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO USING CREATIVE COMMONS
LICENCES 12 (Jan Engelmann et al. eds., 2014), https://www.unesco.de/fileadmin/medien/Dok
umente/Kommunikation/Open_Content_A_Practical_Guide_to_Using_Open_Content_Licenc
es_web.pdf.
134 Id.
135 See JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 182–83
(2008), http://thepublicdomain.org/thepublicdomain1.pdf.
136 See Arnoud Engelfriet, The phrase “All rights reserved,” IUS MENTIS (May 25, 2006), http://
www.iusmentis.com/copyright/allrightsreserved/.
137 BOYLE, supra note 135, at 182.
138 Id. at 181. This “announcement to the world” includes the “cc” emblem on all of one’s
copyrighted material or other icons indicating which rights are still reserved for the author.
Additionally, the licenses can be tagged digitally so that search engines can detect exactly what
freedoms have been given.
131
132
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Creative Commons licenses come in a variety of formats depending on
which rights the author wants to give away and which rights they want to
keep.139 This flexibility is one of the key benefits of the license. Currently,
there are six different licenses that incorporate four possible conditions an
author can select.140
The first and most liberal condition is “Attribution.” Under this condition,
the licensee can use, copy, distribute, display, perform, and make derivative
works off of the original so long as they give credit to the original author and
point to the original source so that others can find it.141 Since 2004, this
condition has become a part of every Creative Commons License.142 The
second condition is “NonCommercial” under which users are prohibited from
using the work commercially. The licensee still has all the wide freedoms of
use, but not for a commercial use.143 This condition is adopted by nearly three
quarters of licensees. The third condition is “No Derivatives.” This allows the
licensee to copy, distribute, and display the licensed works but only the
verbatim original.144 Licensees are prohibited from creating or using derivative
works based on the original.145 The last condition is the “ShareAlike”
condition. This condition is most comparable to the Open Source License
condition for software.146 It requires the subsequent users to permit the use of
their derivative works under the same terms chosen by the original creator.147
This condition prevents anyone from taking the freely distributed work,
modifying it, and then keeping it for exclusive or proprietary use.148 Currently,
the “ShareAlike” condition has been credited the most for creating an
intellectual property commons that more fully perpetuates the sharing of
material.149 The simple language and flexible options for the standardized
license are advantageous to both the original author and any subsequent

139 See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses (last
visited Sept. 20, 2016).
140 Id.
141 See Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 1935, 1979 n.240 (2014).
142 See Glenn Otis Brown, Announcing (and explaining) our new 2.0 licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS
(May 25, 2004), http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216.
143 Johnson, supra note 141, at 1979.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See Lynn M. Forsythe & Deborah J. Kemp, Creative Commons: For The Common Good?, 30 U.
LA VERNE L. REV. 346, 357 (2009).
148 See Zachary Katz, Pitfalls of Open Licensing: An Analysis of Creative Commons Licensing, 46 IDEA
391, 396–97 (2006).
149 Id.
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licensee.150 Both parties have a relatively clear understanding of exactly what
they are agreeing to without requiring any actual contract or legal
interpretation.151
Given the lack of domestic cases concerning the Creative Commons license,
there is a degree of uncertainty concerning how the court would interpret the
license. Scholars have identified three different possibilities: under contract law,
under property law, and under a hybrid of the two.152 Under a contract law view,
the plain terms of the license would govern the use of the licensed patent. An
issue with that is the lack of clarity surrounding the terms utilized by Creative
Commons in their licenses. While the language is simple and easy to understand
to the average consumer, the indefinite nature of the terms could result in great
uncertainty as to how the licensor intended those terms to be interpreted.153
Under a contract law interpretation, the license would be enforceable against
third parties under the “shrink-wrap” nature of licenses.154 ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg155 is the seminal case setting the scope of a license for a nonnegotiated contract. Much like the parties in that case, use of Tesla’s patents
would make the terms of the license enforceable upon the third party.
Drauglis v. Kappa Map Group LLC156 is one of the few domestic cases to deal
with the Creative Common License. In that case, the D.C. District Court did
not question the validity of the license even though it was a matter of first
impression. It addressed the Creative Commons License under the contract
analysis by simply stating that “[a] license is governed by the laws of contract”
so long as it does not offend any canons of copyright law.157
Others have suggested that the injured party would not attempt to enforce a
contract right but rather a property right, given that the statutory protections
are in fact based on property rights rather than private contracting.158 Under
this view, an intellectual property license is not a contract; it is instead a
unilateral legal action that “defines the boundaries of legitimate use.”159 In the

KRUETZER, supra note 133, at 15.
Id.
152 See Adrienne K. Goss, Note, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative Commons
Project, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 984–87 (2007).
153 Id. at 982–83.
154 Id. at 985; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Panel I: Intellectual Property and Public Values: What
Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 375, 406 (2005).
155 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. Wis. 1996).
156 128 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2015).
157 Id. at 11–12 (citing Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1107 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
158 Elkin-Koren, supra note 154, at 403–04.
159 Id. at 404–05.
150
151
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event of a potential breach, the license would default back to its standard
copyright (or patent for Tesla) norms.160
However, basing the interpretation solely on property rights does not
explain how the licensor can expand their rights beyond what the
copyright/patent affords.161 There is no right to attribution in the copyright
statutes, yet the attribution license is one of the most used Creative Commons
Licenses.162 Intellectual property rights usually prevent others from using one’s
works without permission. A purely property-based view does not explain how
the license instead can create an affirmative duty to a third party.
The Creative Commons License can best be explained by a quasi-hybrid
concept of contract and real property known as an “intellectual easement.”163
Under this easement approach, the intellectual property owner still retains
control over the essential property but the licensee can depend on limited rights
of use.164 Some type of hybrid framework may provide the adequate
enforcement of both benefits and compliance against third parties.165
IV. MAKING TESLA’S CHOICE
A. OPEN SOURCE PATENTS

An Open Source License could meet all of Musk’s goals when he announced
the opening of the patents. In fact, he even referenced open source in his blog
post.166 The license both allows Musk to protect his company and brand from
individuals who would not use Tesla’s technology in “good faith” while still
encouraging market adoption and improvements and avoiding the roadblocks
patent law can create. The wide acceptance of the Open Source License can
give innovators the necessary trust to take the leap of faith and utilize Tesla’s
patents.167
Currently, biotech research has been the main field to try to apply the open
source software movement to patent law and could potentially serve as a model

160 Goss, supra note 152, at 986 (citing Severine DeCollier, Open Source and Copyleft: Authorship
Reconsidered?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 281, 286 (2003)).
161 Elkin-Koren, supra note 154, at 405.
162 Id.
163 Goss, supra note 152, at 986 (quoting R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual
Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1032 (2003)).
164 Id. at 987.
165 Id.
166 Musk, supra note 1.
167 See Alan Ho, Enterprise adoption of open source is on the rise, ZDNET (Nov. 18, 2014), http://
www.zdnet.com/article/enterprise-adoption-of-open-source-is-on-the-rise/.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss1/10

20

Hill: Powering Intellectual Property Sharing: How to Make Tesla’s Paten

2016]

POWERING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHARING

211

for Tesla.168 However, this biotech research setting is markedly different from
the automobile industry. The need for Open Source in biotech evolved because
of the patent anticommons that arose when academic institutions did large
amounts of research and then patented all of it.169 This “upstream” research far
removed from any commercial product would then prevent any “downstream”
commercial applications of that research.170 In the automotive industry, all of
the patents are in place for commercial production, and there is no real
differentiation between upstream and downstream. There has been a decent
amount of scholarly research identifying some of the issues with applying open
source to biotech patent law, yet few seem to have focused much attention on
the possibilities and hindrances of applying open source to all of patent law.
One of the most obvious differences between open source software and open
sourcing Tesla’s patents is the equipment required to modify and improve such
technology. Open Source software innovation often requires only a computer
and a certain level of programming skills.171 To work on Tesla’s battery designs
and potentially even improve them, one would require the necessary tools and
mechanical sophistication, and it is highly unlikely that the average mechanic or
inventor would have access to the requisite materials. In addition to the
equipment required for modification, it has been postulated that in order to truly
be an open source product, Tesla would also have to disclose their engineering
documentation in addition to their patents.172 These technical limitations most
likely would limit the potential number of participants to only the current
automobile corporations that are interested in such technology as compared to
the numerous groups and individuals who work on open source software.
That said, this issue is not the fault of an open source patent. Rather, it is an
inherent difficulty of the high tech nature of Tesla’s patents that would be a
potential stumbling block regardless of the method it chose to encourage the use
of its patents. The reason this is especially relevant to an open source patent is
because of the collective nature of the open source movement. Open Source
software is usually based on a peer-production model where a group of
developers guides the additions of new code written by many others into the core
software.173 This collaboration allows for frequent changes to occur much faster
than traditional software development and is a key component of the Open
Source license.174 In comparison, automobile manufacturers rarely act in such
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Feldman, supra note 87, at 117–18.
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 698.
Marshall, supra note 107, at 491–92.
Id. at 513.
Wharton, supra note 22.
Feldman & Nelson, supra note 84, at 23.
Id.
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accord.175 The very nature of working with real materials instead of computer
code makes it that much more difficult to develop and incorporate new ideas
quickly. Finally, the amount of testing and development that must occur for a
new battery design is much greater than running a software program.
Furthermore, Elon Musk seemed to indicate in his blog post and a
subsequent interview a certain reluctance to work with other parties in using
Tesla’s patents.176 Admittedly these quotes were made in the context of
licensing agreements, and Tesla has shown a certain willingness to work with
other manufacturers in the past.177 Maybe there is a chance they would be
willing to serve as the central hub of innovating their technology with other
manufacturers. Perhaps the carbon crisis that served as the catalyst for Musk’s
decision would be sufficient for Tesla to take on this burden.178
B. PATENT POOLS

For Tesla, the ability to set the standard for electric vehicles and their
charging stations would be extremely appealing.179 Setting agreed upon
standards for both the batteries and the charging stations would help increase
the number of manufacturers that adopt Tesla’s technology and would
hopefully encourage others to enter the market with a greater presence.180 The
lack of charging stations compared to gas stations is already one of the main
obstacles to consumers buying electric vehicles. That problem gets even more
complicated if every electric vehicle manufacturer creates their own exclusive
charging type and station.181 Many other electric vehicles cannot even accept
the power level that Tesla chargers deliver.182 Given Tesla’s unique position as
the premier innovator in a hopefully emerging electric vehicle industry, the
175 See generally Stephen Edelstein, BMW: No Interest In Tesla Cooperation, Musk Was Posturing For
PR, GREEN CAR REPORTS (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.greencarreports.com/news/1095695_bm
w-no-interest-in-tesla-cooperation-musk-was-posturing-for-pr.
176 Every Elon Musk Video, supra note 120; Musk, supra note 1.
177 In the past, Tesla has partnered with both Daimler and Toyota to produce battery
components. See Edelstein, supra note 175.
178 Musk, supra note 1.
179 Id.
180 Wharton, supra note 22 (noting that in Shanghai chargers compatible with Tesla are not
being installed because they are different from those of other carmakers).
181 See Joel Hruska, Tesla reveals plan to share Supercharger network with other electric car makers,
EXTREMETECH (June 11, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/184141-teslareveals-plan-to-share-supercharger-network-with-other-electric-car-makers.
182 Id.; see also Zachary Shahan, Electric Car Charging Capabilities — Comparison of 27 Models,
EVOBSESSION (Sept. 8, 2015), http://evobsession.com/electric-car-charging-capabilities-compar
ison-of-27-models/ (showing that Tesla is the only vehicle capable of being charged with the
fastest charge type).
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ability to set the standard could help direct the future of the industry in the right
direction.
Creating a patent pool with standard-setting with other auto manufacturers
could very well be the solution Musk is looking for. The patent pool option
offers a legitimacy that Musk’s blog post lacks. Furthermore, by officially
dealing with Tesla and the patent pool they help create, other manufacturers
can be confident about avoiding litigation without simply relying on the “good
faith” requirement.183
Adopting the RAND commitment in the standard-setting organization helps
Tesla and encourages others to join.184 Given that Tesla would most likely
dominate the pool, the RAND commitment would help alleviate members’
concerns that Tesla might be able to abuse their market power by selectively
refusing to license or charging higher royalties despite the indications that Musk
does not wish to do so.185 The RAND commitments also help further Tesla’s
goals of removing the “landmines” to innovation. By insisting that the
members also license their relevant technology in fair and non-discriminatory
ways, it ensures that companies will not abuse any potential market power if
part of their intellectual property becomes part of the standard.186
While other companies would benefit from access to Tesla’s patents without
fear of possible repercussions, and Tesla could certainly benefit from making
their charging station the standard for the electric car industry, it is difficult to
predict whether a pool would actually form. The main hindrance to the
formation of a patent pool for the electric vehicle industry is the ability and
willingness of every other major player to contribute to the pool. By the very
nature of forming and joining a patent pool, the potential member would have
to contribute some patents that would be essential to the furtherance of that
technology.187 As mentioned previously in Section I, Tesla is far and away the
main innovator in this area. While other manufacturers have a large number of
patents for electric car technology,188 it is unclear if Tesla would need or want
access to these patents. Given the other companies’ lack of market share of
battery-powered vehicles relative to Tesla, it is uncertain whether or not they
would be able to join. Without having members donate necessary and essential
patents to the pool, it ultimately would become a more complex vehicle for a

See Marshall, supra note 107.
See Miller, supra note 130, at 358.
185 Layne-Farrar, supra note 126.
186 Id.
187 See Ed Levy, Emily Marden, Ben Warren, David Hartell & Isaac Filate, Patent Pools And
Genomics: Navigating A Course To Open Science?, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 82 (2010).
188 Brachmann, supra note 45.
183
184
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run-of-the-mill licensing agreement, and going through that hassle for such a
licensing agreement is likely not in the interests of Elon Musk and Tesla.189
Furthermore, a patent pool might not be viable for the current automobile
industry as a whole. Such a patent pool would require a high degree of
cooperation for what is often considered a highly competitive industry.190 For
the most part, patent pools form when the members’ interests already align in
such a way that utilizing their patents against each other was already unlikely.191
The automobile industry does not exactly meet this standard.192 While large
manufacturers have often preferred to settle their disputes outside of the legal
system, and the rate of patent-related litigation between industry players has
remained steady in recent years,193 the industry is still much more litigious than
it has been historically.194 Some pools have only been able to form when the
government has stepped in to aid in solving the collective action problems
common to group bargaining.195 When technology useful to the military was
not being developed because of conflicting property rights, government threats
of the eminent domain power contributed to the formation of patent pools.196
Seeing how it is unlikely that the federal government is going to put pressure on
the auto industry to increase production of electric cars, perhaps the collective
bargaining issues are insurmountable.
Finally, assuming that there are major players with essential patents to
contribute to the patent pool, there are still issues with then defining the RAND
standards employed. There is no universally agreed upon operational definition
of RAND licensing commitments.197 Standard-setting organizations are left to
employ whatever fairness language they require for licensing. Oftentimes they

Every Elon Musk Video, supra note 120.
See Hannah Lutz, U.S. Market Has Never Been More Competitive, IHS Says (Dec. 18, 2014, 7:00
AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20141218/RETAIL01/141219880/u.s.-market-has-nev
er-been-more-competitive-ihs-says.
191 Asay, supra note 81, at 477.
192 See Lutz, supra note 190.
193 See Melinda DeSantis, Steven Oberholtzer & Robert Shereda, A Review of Patent Related Trends
in the Auto Industry, LAW360 (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:22 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/64612
8/a-review-of-patent-related-trends-in-the-auto-industry (identifying patent trolls as the main
increase in litigation for the time period between 2008 and 2013 with the litigation between
industry players remaining steady while depicting data showing an increase in patent applications
and a willingness to defend them).
194 See Steven L. Oberholtzer & Bradley L. Smith, More Fights Over Intellectual Property: Auto
Industry Throws Away Henry Ford’s Rulebook, BRINKS HOFER GILSON & LIONE 1 (2007), http://
www.brinks gilson.com/files/oberholtzer__smith_article.pdf.
195 Merges, supra note 110, at 1356.
196 Id. at 1356–57 (“In at least one case, the aircraft industry, a long-term industry patent pool
was formed in the wake of the government’s forced licensing.”).
197 Layne-Farrar, supra note 126.
189
190
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adopt vague language and leave it up to the courts to determine what license
terms would be fair and reasonable.198
Tesla would likely favor the most open and generous RAND terms beyond
the usual access lock in, but other companies may disagree. Traditional vehicle
manufacturers lack the incentives of Tesla to license the technology on such
favorable terms given that they would merely be taking advantage of a potential
market instead of actively trying to build it up as Tesla has been doing. While
Tesla has identified their patents as roadblocks to innovators, the traditional
companies are less likely to adopt terms that mandate such a favorable licensing
structure.199 This potential wrangling over the terms in which the essential
patents are licensed out may be insurmountable with regards to forming the
patent pool and adopting the Tesla charging station as the standard.
C. CREATIVE COMMONS PATENT LICENSE

The final option for Tesla is to modify the Creative Commons License in
copyright law and make it applicable to patent law. A patent commons is not a
new idea and has been created in the past with varying degrees of success.200
The simplicity and wide adoption of the Creative Commons license201 would
make it a very attractive option for Tesla and Elon Musk in the patent field.
Musk has made it very clear that Tesla is not interested in formalized talks with
a potential user of its patents.202 He simply wants companies to use them.203
While a patent version of the Creative Commons License would still very much
be a license, it is not a licensing agreement that requires communication
between parties. It would merely be an indication by Tesla that the use of the

198 See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing
Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 239–40 (2014).
199 Ford claimed to open up their patents in a similar move to Tesla’s, but some were quick to
point out that this was merely an invitation to license a portion of its patents compared to Tesla
opening up of all its patents. See Mike Masnick, Ford Pretends To Open Up Its Patents Like Tesla, But
Doesn’t; Media Falls For It, TECHDIRT (May 29, 2015, 9:40 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/article
s/20150529/06161831144/ford-pretends-to-open-up-patents-like-tesla-doesnt-media-falls-it.shtml.
200 Notably, Creative Commons partnered with Nike and Best Buy to create a digital commons
called GreenXchange to help patent holders collaborate for sustainability. See Kaitlin Thaney,
GreenXchange – a project of Creative Commons, Nike and Best Buy, CREATIVE COMMONS BLOG (Feb. 10,
2009), https://creativecommons.org/2009/02/10/greenxchange-a-project-of-creative-commonsnike. The BIOS Project uses a patent license similar to the “ShareAlike” Creative Commons
license. See What Characterizes a BIOS-compliant agreement?, BIOS, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/
faqs/bios-mta-faqs.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
201 Estimated 350 million works in 2009. See History, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativeco
mmons.org/about/history (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
202 Every Elon Musk Video, supra note 120.
203 Id.
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patent is truly as open as Musk and the license say it is. No one would need to
contact Tesla about the potential uses or permissions or the definition of “good
faith.” They could simply read the easily understandable language of the license
and rely on those protections.
The lack of royalties may be a deterrence to other companies, but it does not
appear to bother Musk.204 Given his disinterest in entering into licensing
agreements with other companies, it is safe to assume that he is not seeking
royalties either. While paying a royalty may not be a great deterrence to a large
company with significant funds, it may be more than a small innovator could
afford. This lack of royalties is an additional way to increase the potential
adopters.
Additionally, the users would have the full confidence and trust to actually
take advantage of Tesla’s generous offer. Instead of the informal blog post with
a dubious chance of being upheld in court, the parties could rely on a
standardized license format that has been used millions of times across the
globe. It is not a blog post but rather a contract that in the past fifteen years
has yet to be rejected by the courts.
Given how recent of an invention the Creative Commons License is, there
are still questions regarding its enforceability. Even though the license has been
adopted for millions of works, there has been very little case law to chart the
treatment of the license by the courts.205 The lack of judicial endorsement may
serve to scare away any potential adopters of Tesla’s patents as being no better
than the pledge made by Musk. As such, we are forced to speculate about the
treatment of a Creative Commons License for both copyright and patent.
One of the main concerns of the potential technology adopters after Musk’s
pledge was the repercussions if Musk eventually decided that the free use of
Tesla’s patents was no longer in the company’s best interests. What would
happen to the “infringers”? The adoption of a Creative Commons License
does not completely alleviate this concern as it is still unclear what would
happen in court if the owner decided to revoke the license.206 In a purely
contractual regime, revoking the license may be a breach of contract entitling
the licensee to damages.207 In the alternative, a revocation may entitle the
intellectual property owner to enforce their rights against the third party.208
However, there is a strong argument that the licenses are not so easily
revocable. This argument is based in part on the language found in the licenses
Id.
See Ashley West, Little Victories: Promoting Artistic Progress Through the Enforcement of Creative
Commons Arbitrations and Share-Alike Licenses, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 903, 916–18 (2009).
206 Elkin-Koren, supra note 154, at 417–18.
207 Id.
208 Id.
204
205
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themselves.209 In the “Termination” clause of the licenses, they specify that the
rights granted to the licensee are “perpetual (for the duration of the applicable
copyright).”210 That clause only provides for a termination of the license when
the licensee breaches one of the conditions.211 Additionally, that termination
only applies to that breaching licensee.212 Given the plain language of this
provision, it is likely that most would interpret its meaning to be that the rights
granted last at least as long as the copyright (or patent in Tesla’s case) is in place
and is not revocable at the will of the licensor.213 Given the lack of litigation on
the matter, the uncertainty continues to exist and may prevent others from
adopting Tesla’s patents.
While adopting such a liberal license may be an optimal strategy for
encouraging others to utilize Tesla’s patents, there is the possibility that Tesla
would be giving up more control than they would be comfortable with. The
different licenses available from the Creative Commons provide the benefit of
not having to individually communicate and set up a licensing agreement with
each interested party, but that lack of interaction comes at the price of not
being able to control exactly how the license is used. The licensee could end up
using Tesla’s intellectual property in a way Musk would consider embarrassing
or offensive.214
Assume that Tesla adopted a Creative Commons Patent License with only
the “share-alike” and “attribution” protections in order to fully maximize the
potential for other automakers to utilize Tesla’s technology in their vehicles.
Those protections would not prohibit anyone from using the patents contrary
to Musk’s wishes so long as they licensed their product in the same fashion and
attributed the technology to Tesla.215 That being said, such concerns may be
overblown with something like electric vehicle technology. Musk’s “good faith”
use limitation would most likely fail to bind the third party given its failure to
appear in the license.

209 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative
Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 315 (2007).
210 Id.
211 Id. at 316.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 315.
214 Johnson, supra note 141, at 1981; Forsythe & Kemp, supra note 147, at 363.
215 One need not spend too much time imagining a parade of horribles of people legally using
Tesla’s technology in embarrassing ways never contemplated by Musk and then attributing it to
Tesla.
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V. CONCLUSION
If Tesla truly wants to save the planet and completely change the industry by
encouraging others to employ their unique and superior battery technology
(whether its motives be genuinely altruistic or somewhat self-serving), then it
must do more in order to accomplish those goals. Merely making a pledge and
a good-natured promise not to offensively assert its patent rights creates too
much uncertainty for the big players to take a risk.
Given that the current options granted by federal statutes are either to
abstain from patenting or to cede one’s patents to the public domain, Tesla will
have to turn to private ordering in order to create confidence in its intentions.
The optimal tool for Tesla to employ would be a patent version of the Creative
Commons License. The licenses are both simple and easy to understand and
have been extremely popular in the realm of copyright. Furthermore, they are
flexible and easy to adopt in such a way that meets Tesla’s goals. Creative
Commons and Tesla could work together to produce a license for a new electric
vehicle commons. This license would most likely be a simple modification of a
ShareAlike license to ensure that the technology stays open to all for the benefit
of the market and the world.
A Creative Commons License could be the easiest way for Tesla to signal to
the market that it truly intend to share its patents, and it would have more
substance than a mere blog post. Potential adopters could have their legal
teams analyze the licenses, and they could reasonably assume the court would
give more weight to an official license than a blog post.
Furthermore, this would allow Tesla to guarantee its intentions at an arm’s
length. If it chose to create a patent pool, it would still have to go through a
series of negotiations with the members for just about every feature of the pool.
And if it went with the Open Source License (even though it was in a large part
the inspiration for the Creative Commons License), it would run into the
difficulties of how the automobile industry is not comparable to the software
industry due to the communication issues inherent to a more competitive
industry.
The Creative Commons Patent License would attempt to work within the
existing patent rules by “enabling a creator to have better tools to make a wider
range of choices” similar to how the license works in copyright.216 Tesla does
not desire to exercise its full monopoly rights, and a patent version of the
Creative Commons License could very well be the best way to effectively make
that happen.

216

Goss, supra note 152, at 992.
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It may be years until evidence surfaces of whether or not Musk’s patent
pledge was truly sufficient to accomplish all of the lofty goals of Tesla
Motors,217 and perhaps we will never know whether it was due to the issues
with the pledge itself or the industry’s reluctance to actively pursue electric
vehicles. Regardless, Musk can take a simple step to help his goals become a
reality, and a Creative Commons Patent License may just accomplish that.

217

The early indication is less than positive. See supra note 19.
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